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Abstract: Quota obligation schemes based on tradable green certicates have become a
popular policy instrument to expand power generation from renewable energy sources
(RES). Their application, however, can neither be justied as a rst-best response to
a market failure, nor, in a second-best sense, as an instrument mitigating distortionary
eects of the emissions externality, if an emissions trading system exists that fully covers
the energy industry. We study how ancillary reasons, in form of overcoming various bar-
riers for RES use and establishing benecial side-eects, such as industry development,
energy security, and abatement of pollutants not covered under the ETS, apply to the
scheme recently introduced in Poland. While setting substantial expansion incentives,
an advantage for local industry or job-market development or energy security can hardly
be seen. With rising power prices for end consumers and awareness that the extra rents
from the schemes mostly accrue to foreign investors and renewable and polluting gener-
ators, we expect a negative impact on social acceptance for RES and RES deployment
support policies.
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According to basic welfare economics, every policy intervention (unless directly enhanc-
ing social welfare) needs a market failure at its basis; and every market failure requires
one policy instrument which should mitigate the distortion in question without increas-
ing another distortion (Ng 2004, Stiglitz 2000). A prime example constitutes the release
of greenhouse gases (GHG) into the atmosphere, which has been dubbed the \greatest
externality ever" (Sinn 2008). It is a market failure because many are likely to suer
from the consequences of climate change, while, without regulation, emitters lack an
economic incentive to reduce emissions. In an idealized world with perfect information,
perfect competition, and no other market failure than the emissions externality, a cap-
and-trade system for GHG emission permits or a GHG emission tax provide a rst-best
response of environmental policy allowing full internalization of the externality. If a rst-
best instrument, in this sense, is unavailable, second-best instruments may be used to
mitigate the distortionary eect of a market failure.1 Feed-in taris for green electricity,
and quota obligation schemes based on tradable green certicates (TGC) are examples
of possible second-best instruments of environmental policy: while not immediately re-
sponding to a market failure, the expanded use of renewable energy sources (RES) may,
in the absence of other environmental policy, mitigate GHG emissions by substitution
of conventional fossile energy sources. If, however, an emissions trading scheme (ETS)
is in place that fully covers the energy industry, the emissions from the covered sectors
are capped by the ETS irrespective of the generation portfolio, and expanded RES use
can hardly further mitigate the related emissions externality. In this situation successful
RES-support policies tend to lead to excessive power generation costs, power prices and
rents to green-electricity generators.2 Moreover, the carbon price will be negatively dis-
torted, alleviating abatement pressure from polluting technologies. Thus, in the presence
of an ETS, the application of a TGC-based quota obligation scheme (or of feed-in taris
alike) can neither be justied in a rst-best sense, nor in a second-best sense.3
1 Generally, the theoretical justication of policy interventions in a second-best world is subtle (see
Cremer et al. 1998, Fullerton and Wolverton 2005, and the references therein for a useful discussion).
Fullerton and West (2002), e.g., study for car emissions (where, in contrast to the energy industry, a
rst-best response is actually unavailable) how other policy measures can mimic a direct emissions tax.
2 See Pethig and Wittlich (2009), Traber and Kemfert (2009) for illustrations of these relationships.
Frondel et al. (2008) calculate that due to the German feed-in-tari scheme an average household
has additional annual power costs of about ¤31.5. Subsidies for photovoltaics (PV) alone cumulated
to about ¤26.5bn since the introduction of the scheme in 2000 until 2007, to which by 2010 another
¤27bn will add. The abatement of 1 tonne CO2 through additional PV use costs about ¤760.
3 This statement holds more generally than the discussion above suggests. As is well recognized, the
innovation and diusion of new technologies may be accompanied by further market failures, especially
2In this paper, we analyze the Polish TGC scheme with regard to its economic func-
tioning, and its justication with reference to ancillary reasons. By ancillary reasons, we
understand reasons that may justify the application of a TGC scheme, beyond a rst-
or second-best reasoning, on politically-pragmatic grounds. These reasons comprise, for
example, overcoming potential legal, institutional, infrastructure, funding, technolog-
ical, and social barriers for renewable-technology deployment, and the establishment
of benecial side-eects. Benecial side-eects may include stimulation of employment
or industry development, technological diversication, and abatement of pollutants not
covered under the ETS. Poland agreed in its EU accession treaty to an indicative target
of 7.5% RES contribution to gross electricity consumption by 2010 (European Parlia-
ment 2003), which translates into a 10.4% RES quota of total electricity generation for
that year. In 2006, when the TGC scheme was introduced, Poland generated 60.8% of
its electricity from hard coal, 34.9% from brown coal, 2.6% from RES, and 1.7% from
natural gas (Sejm 2006, URE 2008a).4 EU member since 2004, the country has been
part of the EU ETS since its start in 2005.
The literature on TGC-based quota obligation schemes has covered a range of issues.5
Apart from numerous studies on regional systems, the eectiveness and eciency of such
schemes have been compared especially to those of feed-in taris (e.g., Menanteau et al.
2003, Finon and Menanteau 2004, Palmer and Butraw 2005, Finon 2006, Finon and Perez
2007), and their interaction with emissions trading schemes (ETS) has been analyzed
(e.g., Morthorst 2001, Amundsen and Mortensen 2001, Jensen and Skytte 2003, Del
Rio 2007, Gillenwater 2008b). Further contributions have focused on particular aspects,
such as the relationship between wind supply volatility and TGC price (Lemming 2003),
certicate banking and TGC price volatility (Amundsen et al. 2006), market power in
TGC markets and power prices (Amundsen and Bergman 2008) and the role of long-term
contracts for TGC-market eciency (Kildegaard 2008). Surprising to us is that none of
these contribution has raised the question of what the application of a TGC-based quota
obligation scheme justies as a fundamental issue.6 The Polish TGC scheme has, to the
in form of knowledge spillovers as related to the public-good nature of new knowledge from R&D,
learning by doing or learning by using (Jae et al. 2002, 2005). Typically, a Pigou subsidy or a
respective credit, as rst-best measures, can reward an RES technology producer for foregone rents
which others appropriate when using the newly generated knowledge in their own production. Again,
(implicit) subsidies for RES technology use can hardly internalize these externalities.
4 47.4% of its 4.3 terawatt hours (TWh) of green electricity in 2006 were generated from hydropower,
43% from biomass, 4.3% from wind, and 3.7% from biogas (GUS 2007).
5 See, e.g., Agnolucci (2007) for a survey, and Gillenwater (2008a,b), Wiser et al. (2005) for fairly
encompassing discussions of denition and dierent aspects.
6 This is not to say that critical concerns have not been mentioned in the literature. For example,
3best of our knowledge, not been examined in the scientic literature yet.7
Section 2 describes the TGC scheme implemented in Poland in detail. Section 3 ana-
lyzes, based on a cash-ow model, the conditions for wind-power investments under this
support scheme in Poland.8 In section 4, we discuss how ancillary reasons justify the
application of the Polish TGC scheme. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Polish TGC scheme
The Polish TGC scheme, as is characteristic for such schemes, requires electricity dis-
tributors to prove that a certain proportion (quota) of their electricity sold is generated
from RES.9 The quota is dened by the Ministry of Economics and amounted to 3.6%
in 2006, 5.1% in 2007, and 7% in 2008.10 Retailers are obliged to grant grid access to
RES producers. The fed-in green power is remunerated to producers at the average mar-
ket price of conventionally generated power, the level of which is determined by the
Polish energy regulatory oce URE. Retailers prove quota fulllment by submitting
green certicates to URE. One certicate refers to one megawatt hour (MWh) of RES
electricity, and has an indenite maturity, so that they can be banked across trading
periods. No distinction is made whether green electricity is generated from hydropower,
wind, biomass, biogas, photovoltaics, solar, or geothermal energy. URE also issues the
TGC and distributes them to generators according to their amount of RES electric-
ity produced. Retailers may either buy electricity and green certicates at the Polish
Power Exchange (POLPX), or receive them via bilateral long-term contracts with RES
generators in which the two parties x the prices of electricity and green certicates.
There is no legally dened upper and lower price limit in certicate trading. Decisive
for quota fulllment is the number of TGC submitted, not whether RES electricity has
actually been provided to consumers according to the quota. With its submission, a
TGC vanishes. A retailer who fails to fulll his RES quota is ned for the unfullled
part. The ne is set annually by URE. In 2006, it was ¤61.60 (PLN 240) per missing
Sorrell and Sijm (2003), Frondel et al. (2008) have clearly pointed to the lack of additional emissions
reductions below the ETS target if implemented in parallel. Policy documents, however, such as EU
Commission (2008), follow the favorable arguments in the literature.
7 A few (rather early or survey) papers or studies have covered aspects of RES policies in the region,
e.g., Barbu (2007), Hindsberger et al. (2003), Paska et al. (2009), OPTRES (2007), Reiche (2006).
8 This working-paper version contains, moreover, a description of the Romanian TGC scheme, and an
analogous analysis of conditions for wind-power investments for Romania in appendix.
9 See Lemming (2003), Menanteau et al. (2003), e.g., for general descriptions of TGC schemes.
10 See Table 1 for the period 2009-2014.
4green certicate,11 in 2007 ¤64.06 (PLN 242.40), in 2008 ¤70.74 (PLN 248.46) (URE
2007a, 2008b). The level of the ne introduces an upper price limit in the TGC market,
the so-called buy-out price.
2.1 Development of TGC prices and RES generation
In 2006, for a gross electricity consumption of 150.87 terawatt hours (TWh)12 (Paska
et al. 2009), 5.43 million green certicates would have been necessary to meet the RES
quota of 3.6%; but RES power generation only reached 4.2 TWh, leading to the issuance
of 4.2 million TGC. In 2007 and 2008, gross electricity consumption rose, respectively, to
154.17 TWh and 154.89 TWh (PSE Operator 2009), with corresponding TGC demands
of 7.86 million and 10.84 million to satisfy the RES quotas of, respectively, 5.1% and 7%.
To meet the 2007 TGC demand, as compared to 2006, an increase of electricity generation
from RES by 87% would have been necessary, to meet the 2008 TGC demand another
increase by 37%. That the realization of this development of production was not realistic
can also be seen at the price trend for TGC, which touched the level of the ne for missing
TGC of ¤61.60 (PLN 240) in mid-2006 (Figure 1). Beside TGC trading at POLPX,
Figure 1: OZEX (TGC-price index at POLPX) (data: POLPX 2008).
it is also possible to sell certicates directly to distributors via bilateral contracts. In
11 The certicate trading is in Polish Zloty (PLN), as have been our calculations. To display, to some
extent, the exchange-rate volatility to which actors are subject, we indicate prices in this section in
nominal Euro and PLN values. The annual average exchange rate was PLN 3.8959/¤ in 2006, PLN
3.7837/¤ in 2007, PLN 3.5121/¤ in 2008 (ECB 2009).
12 A terawatt hour is 106 MWh.
52007, 74.4% of all certicates were traded this way (POLPX 2008). The price for these
transactions ranged in a span of ¤39.64-63.43 (PLN 150-240). The remuneration for RES
power fed into the grid, which is based on the price of conventionally produced power,
amounted to ¤30.72 (PLN 119.7) in 2006 and to ¤34.04 (PLN 128.8) in 2007 (URE
2007b, 2008c). In 2007, RES producers could thus have realized a combined revenue from
TGC and electricity of up to ¤97.47 (PLN 368.8) per MWh green electricity generated.
2.2 Development forecast for the Polish TGC market
For a judgment of the possible development of the Polish TGC market in the near
future, it is rst necessary to estimate the TGC demand. Table 1 lists the results,
derived using the estimates of gross electricity consumption for the years 2009{2013 in
URE (2009: 53).13
Table 1: TGC demand estimation.
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Power cons. (TWh) 158.1 159.9 162.8 165.7 168.5 171.1
RES quota (%) 8.7 10.4 10.4 10.4 10.4 10.4
TGC demand (million) 13.57 16.63 16.93 17.23 17.52 17.79
The development of hydropower is restricted by the government to avoid further in-
trusion into ecological systems by this technology. Therefore, only a slight increase in
small hydropower has been expected (Paska et al. 2009), so that electricity generation
from hydropower is unlikely to exceed 2.1 TWh in the near future.
Further available technologies to increase RES power generation in Poland include
biomass and biogas. Power generation from these sources reached 1.9 TWh in 2006, 0.5
TWh more than in 2005 (Paska et al. 2009). The German Ministry of the Environment
estimates a span of ¤80{210 for the power generation cost of biomass and biogas (BMU
2007). In view of the maximum revenue expectation from electricity generation and TGC
for 2007 of about ¤97.47 per MWh, as calculated above, the development opportunities
of biogas and biomass seem limited due to the high risk for such projects to become
unprotable when the TGC price decreases.
13 The estimate for 2014 has been extrapolated using the average growth rate of gross electricity con-
sumption between 2009 and 2013.
6For a constant annual growth for biomass of 0.5 TWh until 2014 and a hydropower
production in 2014 of 2.1 TWh, a production gap of 9.79 TWh remains to fulll the
RES quota shown in Table 1. This gap could possibly be lled by electricity from wind
power plants. At the end of 2007, their capacity amounted to 267 MW (EWEA 2008a).
PSEW (2008) estimates the load factor for wind energy plants in Poland in a range of
20{35%. It can be assumed that projects with the highest load factors will get realized
rst. An average load factor of 30% then implies the need of 3.725 MW of wind power
capacity14 to fulll the RES quota of 10.4% in 2014. This value implies the need for an
annual capacity growth of about 532 MW until 2014. In 2007 only wind power plants
with a capacity of 123 MW have been erected. A rapid increase in the annually erected
capacity will thus be required to fulll the targets. EWEA (2008b) estimates that the
Polish wind power production capacity will only meet 1,000 MW in 2010.
Because the RES quotas set by the Polish government will hardly be achieved, the
TGC price is likely to remain high in the short and medium term. Whether the quota
will be fullled until 2014 depends on further biomass and biogas growth and accelerated
wind power plant construction. If the RES quota is not met in 2014, TGC demand will
exceed TGC supply. This should lead to a TGC spot market price near the ne of ¤70.74
(PLN 248.46).
3 Conditions for wind-power investments
To evaluate the immediate incentives set for investors by the Polish TGC scheme, we
analyze the protability of a hypothetical 20-MW wind-farm project with a 20-year
economic lifetime.15 We compare two possible investor strategies: selling both TGC and
electricity at the relevant exchanges (Option 1), and the conclusion of bilateral long-term
contracts to sell TGC and electricity directly to distributors (Option 2).
3.1 Cash-ow model and framework data
A necessary condition for an investor to invest in a single project is that it has a positive
internal rate of return (IRR).16 A sucient condition is, in general, that it yields a higher
14 The gure derives as 9,790,000 MWh = 3.725 MW * 24 h * 365 days * 0.30 load factor.
15 We stick to parameter values as typically used in practice. For example, 20 MW installed capacity
of the wind farm constitutes a size big enough for delivery of plants by a technology producer and
where nancing is still available relatively conveniently. A 20-year economic lifetime is the standard
value considered for a wind park; after that time operation-and-maintenance costs increase rapidly.
16 The IRR is the rate of return for which a project's net present value is equal to zero.
7return than a comparable investment on nancial markets.17 RES projects are typically
realized by companies founded for a specic project only, so that granted loans have to
be repaid by the cash ow of the specic project (B ottcher and Blattner 2006, Wiser
and Pickle 1998). We determine the IRR of the reference project based on a standard
cash-ow model (e.g., Perridon and Steiner 2007). The IRR is calculated based on the
dividends paid to shareholders. In Table 2 we indicate how the dividend payments are
calculated.











- dividend payout for previous period
= cash ow of the period
+ cash on hand from previous period
- debt service fund
= dividend payment of the period
The model also accounts for the perspective of lenders, typically banks. Lenders expect
a project cash ow sucient to serve debt service and to handle risks, such as price
volatility. We consider two instruments banks typically use to enforce a sucient cash
ow: the debt service fund, and the debt service cover ratio (DSCR). The debt service
fund obliges the debtor to hold back a specic amount of cash for bad periods in which
the cash ow is insucient for debt service. (The debt service comprises the payments
for interest and loan redemption of a period.) Dividend payments are only allowed, if
the debt service fund contains cash. The DSCR gives an indication of the project's
capability of serving the debt service of the period. It is calculated as:18
DSCR =
operating cash ow + debt service fund
debt service of the period
DSCR < 1 implies the project lacks capability to serve debt service. Therefore, banks
usually want a project to fulll DSCR >1. Wind farms are often required to fulll
DSCR > 1:3 (B ottcher and Blattner 2006: 104).
17 In subsection 3.4, we compare the hypothetical wind-farm investment with an alternative nancial-
market investment.
18 The operating cash ow is the cash ow directly generated by the operation of the wind farm. It com-
prises the earnings after taxation and depreciation, but not loan redemption or dividend payments.
8In our model dividend payments are only possible, if the debt service fund reaches 50%
of the debt service of the following period, a typical value in practice. As to the DSCR,
we use 1.3 as the benchmark to balance debt and equity. In a projection for the whole
of its duration, a project has to fulll this DSCR in every period. If the project fails
to meet this requirement, the initial equity ratio of period 0, before the start of plant
operation, has to be increased. If the project achieves DSCR > 1:3 in every period, the
equity ratio has to be decreased until any period reaches DSCR = 1:3. This provides for
the simultaneous integration of investor's and lenders' perspectives in the determination
of the equity ratio in the model. We assume the redeemable loans to have a duration of
13 years, that they are free of redemption in the rst year of operation, and have a xed
annual coupon of 7.4%.19 The annual return on deposits is 3%. We adopt the Polish
corporate tax rate of 19%.
As to further framework data, we assume an average load factor of 30%.20 Thus, the
20-MW wind park will have an annual electricity output of 52,560 MWh. The total
investment volume for the wind park amounts to ¤31.094m,21 the operation and main-
tenance (O&M) costs in the rst year of operation to ¤0.9m.22 The annual O&M costs
increase in years 1-10 by 3.5%, and in years 11-20 by 2%.23 The wind farm starts to
operate on 01/01/2009.
3.2 Option 1: market sale of TGC and electricity
The analysis of the market-sale option splits in two steps. In the banking case, we deter-
mine the minimum equity quota claimed, if a conservative lender assumes a worst-case
scenario concerning the price development to secure his money. In the base case, we
calculate the IRR of the project using the equity ratio of the banking case and a price
development an investor could realistically assume.
Banking case. Banks want the project to be able to repay its debts even under the
conditions of a worst-case scenario. Given the young markets for green electricity and
19 Firms are required to save the debt service saved by the freedom from loan redemption in the rst
year in the debt service fund.
20 The load factor of 30% is in the upper third of the ranges in the literature (PSEW 2008: 5, Barbu
2007: 300). Usually more favorable sites are developed rst.
21 The price indications in this section are in values of 2008.
22 Investment volume and rst-year O&M costs are based on ZSW (2008). They include a premium of
2.4% for exchange-rate risks, as the plants have to be imported from the Euro zone.
23 The increase in O&M costs of 3.5% in the rst ten years corresponds to the average ination rate
in Poland in the last years (it may then join the European Currency Union), the 2% increase to the
ECB ination target.
9TGC, and that the project company sells both electricity and TGC at exchanges, the
expected price variability is particularly high. We assume that the estimated electricity
income will not be increased by the regulatory authority URE, but will remain at its 2007
level of ¤36.67/MWh (PLN 128.8/MWh) (URE 2008c) during the 20-year duration of
the forecast. The demand for TGC is likely to exceed supply in Poland in the next years
(subsection 2.2). This implies TGC prices at the upper limit of ¤68.34 (PLN 240) at
least until 2014, where current regulation ends. Because the development of the Polish
RES scheme past 2014 cannot be foreseen yet, we consider an income of ¤0 per TGC as
the realistic assumption for a worst-case scenario for the period of 2015{2028. In Table
3, we also give the results for incomes of ¤59.45 (PLN 80) and ¤70.84 (PLN 120).24
Within the bounds for TGC income after 2014 considered, the reference wind farm needs
an equity ratio of between 70.1% and 23.2%, or ¤21.8 million to ¤7.2 million (PLN 76.5
million to 25.3 million) equity, to ensure a DSCR > 1:3 for the whole duration. The
IRR amounts to between 0.51% and 10.51%. Note that, thus, even for the assumption
of a zero income per TGC in 2015{2028, the IRR is positive.
Table 3: Results market sale of TGC and electricity.
Income per TGC 2015{2028 (¤) 0 22.78 34.17
Combined income (¤) 36.67 59.45 70.84
Equity quota banking case (%) 70.1 38.8 23.2
Equity required (million ¤) 21.8 12.1 7.2
IRR banking case (%) 0.51 6.61 10.51
IRR base case (%) 9.49 12.27 15.70
Base case. The base-case scenario uses the specied equity ratio of the banking case
to calculate the project IRR under the assumptions of an investor. In this scenario the
power income is increased with the ination rate, as the regulatory authority URE links
the RES-power remuneration determined to the average market price of conventionally
generated power. Because of the expectation of increasing prices for fossil fuels, we in-
crease the RES-power remuneration in the base case by 3.5% p.a. for the years 2009-2018
and by 2% p.a. beginning in 2019. The TGC price forecast is more dicult. In concor-
dance with the banking case, we assume that until 2014 the TGC price will remain at its
upper limit of ¤68.34 (PLN 240). Because we do not know, when the RES quota will be
fullled we decrease the TGC income in the forecast annually by 20% beginning in 2015.
24 The required equity quota reaches 0% at an assumed income per TGC in 2015{2028 of ¤66.06 (PLN
232).
10Figure 2 illustrates the price development in the base case. Based on these assumptions
Figure 2: Illustration of price development in the base case.
and under consideration of an banking-case equity ratio of 70.1%, we calculate an IRR
relevant for investors of 9.49% for a Polish 20-MW reference project (Table 3).
3.3 Option 2: bilateral contracts
Bilateral contracts constitute an opportunity to avoid price variability, as RES power
producer and retailer agree to trade electricity and certicates at xed prices during the
time of the contract. Because banks accept the incomes of the project as secured by the
contract, a banking case is no longer necessary. As a consequence, the price agreed in the
bilateral contract has a direct inuence on the level of the equity ratio. The hypothetical
bilateral contract for this project shall comprise agreed prices for electricity and TGC.
The benchmark for the power-price component is the 2007 RES remuneration of ¤36.67
(PLN 128.8) set by URE (URE 2008c). To simplify we use a value of 130 PLN/MWh in
the contract. TGC prices in contracts ranged between ¤42.71 (PLN 150) and ¤68.34
(PLN 240) in 2008 (POLPX 2008). With ¤55.52 (PLN 195) per TGC the average of
this range shall be used for the TGC component of the contract. This implies the project
facing a combined income of ¤92.54 (PLN 325) per MWh of power generated and leads
to an annual project income of ¤4.9 million (PLN 17.1 million).
Under consideration of the bilateral contract above the project requires an equity ratio
of 11.4% or ¤3.6 million (PLN 12.5 million) to fulll the requirement of DSCR > 1:3.
11Table 4: Sensitivity analysis bilateral contracts.
Combined income (¤) 75.45 79.72 84.00 88.27 92.54 96.81 101.08
Combined income (PLN) 265 280 295 310 325 340 355
Equity ratio (%) 30.0 25.4 20.7 16.1 11.4 6.9 2.2
IRR (%) 5.10 6.78 8.70 11.02 14.07 18.64 29.25
The IRR of Option 2 is 14.07%. A sensitivity analysis shows how tightly IRR, equity
ratio and negotiated prices are linked (Table 4).
3.4 Comparison with nancial-market investment
The two investor strategies considered above lead to positive IRR. For the gures we
consider as most realistic (columns in bold in Tables 3 and 4), the IRR is higher in
the case of a bilateral contract than in the market-trading option. Under the bilateral-
contract option, the IRR strongly depends on the prices negotiated for electricity and
TGC (Table 4). For example, if an investor faces a bad negotiating position and the IRR
threatens to be under the IRR of Option 1 of 9.49%, the investor should consider selling
electricity and TGC on the free market. Even in the worst-case-scenario considered in
Option 1 the IRR remains positive and the project is not in danger of illiquidity.
To evaluate the attractiveness of the reference project for an investor, it is necessary to
account, in addition, for the opportunity of an alternative nancial-market investment.
For this comparison, typically the capital-asset-pricing model (CAPM) is used (B ottcher
and Blattner 2006, Perridon and Steiner 2007). If the expected return of the CAPM
exceeds the IRR of the real investment project, the project should be abandoned. We
derive a CAPM reward-to-risk ratio for wind-farm projects in Poland of 9.84%.25 This
value exceeds the IRR of 9.49% calculated for Option 1, meaning that trading TGC and
power on the free market is not interesting under the Polish TGC scheme. Under Option
2, the conclusion of a bilateral contract with a combined income of over ¤86.20 (PLN
303) is necessary (see also Table 4).
Our analysis shows the bilateral-contract option to be more protable than direct
reliance on TGC and electricity markets alone. As a consequence, TGC trading at the
local certicate exchange would be expected to dry up, a tendency which can be seen
25 The gure is calculated as 5:7%+0:666:25%, where 5.7% is the risk-free rate of interest (corresponding
to a similar state bond; Comdirect 2008), 0.66 the beta coecient (calculated based on the indications
of a self-compiled wind power peer group), and 6.25% the risk premium (Damodaran 1999: 72).
12(subsection 2.1).26 This weakens the TGC market as the central element suggesting the
eciency of such schemes. The high quota requirements in Poland are likely to imply
persistently high TGC prices, making these prices de facto better predictable. This moves
the scheme eectively close to one with feed-in taris, with guaranteed prices for green
electricity.27 At the same time, the high quotas enhance the uncertainty as to how the
system will develop in the next decade. Given the favorable investment conditions found
in this section, we conclude that in Poland indeed a relatively fast RES expansion pace
can be expected, mostly based on wind power.
4 Ancillary reasons to justify the Polish TGC scheme
In this section, we study how the application of a TGC scheme in Poland can be justied
with reference to ancillary reasons. As set out in the introduction, only these additional
reasons may justify support policies for RES technology deployment, if, as is the case in
Poland, an ETS is present that fully covers the energy industry. We wish to emphasize
that neither the concept of \ancillary reasons," nor a methodology for their assessment
are established in the literature. Closest to our analysis is OPTRES (2007: ch. 12), which
focuses on administrative, grid, social, and nancial barriers. We adopt a categorization
of barriers, and side-eects, that is more adapted to the situation in Poland, as a new EU
member state with few previous experience with the installation of renewable generation
technology.28 Part of the character of ancillary reasons is that their net social benets
are hard to quantify. As a consequence, the assessment is mostly qualitative.
We distinguish two categories of ancillary reasons:
(1) barriers for the deployment of additional RES technologies that may be inherent
in the economy;
(2) side-eects that may be associated with an expansion of the use of renewable
generation technologies.
We consider ve kinds of barriers and four possible side-eects. The rst two kinds of
barriers, (B1) legal and (B2) institutional, pertain, respectively, to the legal structures
26 This is in line with Kildegaard's (2008) prediction that capital-intensive technologies with low oper-
ational costs { such as wind power { will typically nd a more protable nancing via contracts than
by way of the TGC exchange trading.
27 Of course, feed-in-tari schemes do not implement a particular RES quota.
28 Similar aspects have been studied, e.g., in Neuho (2005), Neuho and Twomey (2008), Sorrell (2003)
and Sorrell and Sijm (2003). We are grateful to Paul Twomey for his input on this section.
13and ecient regulatory institutions to enable or facilitate the integration of renewable
generation capacity into power supply; they are located in the legal system of an econ-
omy. Further preconditions for additional RES technology deployment include (B3) the
available infrastructure, and (B4) the availability of funding and the technologies in ques-
tion. The fth aspect is (B5) the social acceptance of RES technologies. As side-eects,
we consider (S1) the expansion of local job markets, (S2) domestic industry development,
(S3) the diversication of the national generation portfolio, and (S4) the abatement of
pollutants not covered by the (current) ETS.
It is characteristic for these barriers or side-eects that none of them constitutes a
market failure to which subsidies to RES power producers would constitute the corre-
sponding rst-best policy response, or a indirect substitute for a rst-best measure. The
barriers will tend to lock in energy systems with the previously implemented technolo-
gies. Moreover, the barriers hamper the carbon-price signal (as generated by an ETS
or an emissions tax) to become fully eective. The side-eects constitute possible addi-
tional eects of RES support policies. Side-eects may be considered as desirable from a
social-policy (S1, S2), an energy-policy (S3), or an environmental-policy (S4) perspective.
Though, such as stimulation of local job market and industry development, routinely
emphasized in the policy debate, side-eects cannot be recognized as the primary pur-
pose of RES-deployment support. On politically-pragmatic grounds, these barriers and
side-eects may be referred to as ancillary reasons to justify RES support policies as
temporary measures. We consider barriers as more important for a possible ancillary
policy justication than side eects because of their general importance for the energy
system and the eectiveness of the carbon-price signal. Our discussion will mostly focus
on wind power, as the most important RES in Poland in the near future (section 2).
We study in subsection 4.1 whether the introduction of the TGC scheme has been a
necessary requirement, or at least helpful, for overcoming the barriers. In subsection 4.2,
we consider how the TGC scheme has been able to establish the mentioned side-eects.
Subsection 4.3 briey evaluates the ndings.
4.1 Overcoming barriers
(B1, B2) Legal and institutional barriers. The importance of the legal framework and
functional regulatory institutions for economic development in general, and the integra-
tion of new technologies in the energy sector in particular, is well established (e.g., Golini
2005, OPTRES 2007, Williamson 2000). Given the state monopoly for power genera-
tion, transmission and distribution in Poland until 1991, a quick rise of the supply of
14renewable electricity from, typically, decentralized sources was neither obvious, nor did
it happen after the fall of the Iron Curtain (URE 2008a). The question here is how the
establishment of a TGC scheme has been necessary, or helpful, for overcoming legal and
institutional barriers for additional deployment of renewable technologies.
The two major regulatory elements supporting the use of renewable generation tech-
nology and the TGC scheme in Poland today are the 1997 energy law act, and the
energy regulatory oce URE established in the same year (ERRA 2009, Sejm 2006).
The adoption of the energy law act was the decisive step towards a liberalized and more
decentralized national power generation system with unbundled generation, transmis-
sion and distribution (Szwagrun 2004, URE 2008a). The reforms of the Polish energy
sector were especially made in view of the Polish EU accession. This meant to comply
with the requirements of the internal EU electricity market and the EU expansion tar-
get for renewable electricity (Ministry of Economy and Labour 2005).29 The national
decision to set up a TGC scheme was made in response to EU (2001) aiming to achieve
the desired renewables expansion. At the concrete administrative level, today four kinds
of permissions are necessary to establish a new RES plant: an environmental approval
from local authorities, the grid connection agreement with the local grid operator, the
construction permission from local authorities, and the power supply license from URE
(PAIiIZ 2009a,b). In a detailed study of the investment conditions in practice, the im-
precise nature of the regulations to obtain these permissions has been described as the
biggest barrier for wind-power expansion in Poland (PAIiIZ 2009a).30 As a result, the
project development phase, preceding construction works, has been taking between one
and ve years, and thus the time to complete an investment project ranges between four
and seven years.
As a consequence, rst, the developments on EU level, not the national set-up of the
TGC scheme, occur as decisive for overcoming legal and institutional barriers for an
expanded RES use since Poland's democratic turn. Second, the problem of imprecise
rules to obtain permissions is with the Polish legislator; to overcome it, the TGC scheme
may, at best, be helpful due to additional applications, but is not necessary.
(B3) Infrastructure. Infrastructure problems are relevant in Poland in relation to the
grid access of decentralized suppliers, and plant construction (PAIiIZ 2009a).31 For wind-
29 The internal EU electricity market requires that decentralized generators are able to supply electricity
from arbitrary sources (within the established safety bounds) to the national grids (EU 2003); the
renewables expansion targets are described, in particular for the single member states, in EU (2001).
30 See BSJP and Taylor Wessling (2009) for further illustration.
31 OPTRES (2007) discusses in addition the transparency, objectiveness, and length of the grid con-
nection process, it omits issues related to plant construction. The study emphasizes that the set of
15power plants, grid access often is a typical issue, as their location does not necessarily
t well with the national grid (Paska et al. 2009, URE 2008a).32 For project developers,
another issue is the suitability of local transport infrastructure (especially, the roads)
to bring plants and necessary machinery to the construction sites (PAIiIZ 2008, 2009a).
Improvement of transport infrastructure is often part of the licensing agreement with
local authorities. To realize a project, investors may need to pay the additional costs of
both grid connection and infrastructure improvement.33
While the TGC scheme clearly helps to nance the additional costs in relation to
grid connection and infrastructure improvement and, thus, to overcome infrastructure
barriers, one may question the extent to which these investments are among the tasks
of a renewable-technology investor.
(B4) Funding and technological barriers. The availability of funds for the deployment
of renewable generation technology constitutes another typical issue (e.g., Kann 2009,
OPTRES 2007). We discuss in addition the availability of the technologies themselves
and of the necessary knowledge for their erection and operation. Funding barriers have
especially been described for potential domestic investors and operators, who often lack
equity or sucient credit from Polish banks (BSJP and Taylor Wessling 2009, PAIiIZ
2009a).34 Attracted by the high expected rentability, major investors have thus been com-
ing from abroad, including Germany, Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland. Part of the Polish
situation is, moreover, that until recently technology for commercial renewable electric-
ity generation has not been nationally produced (Ministry of Economy and Labour 2005,
PSEW 2010).35 The availability of generation equipment constituted a signicant bar-
rier, with delivery delays for wind turbines of over two years (PAIiIZ 2009a). Due to the
abandonment of orders outside of Poland, and, to some extent, also from Poland, the
problem has practically faded away during the world nancial crisis.
The TGC scheme has certainly been helpful for these barriers not to block the devel-
opment of renewable technology deployment, and necessary for the relatively fast recent
expansion pace. At the same time, it is to be noted that most of the payments associ-
relevant problems tends to be highly country-specic.
32 While the location of these power plants is determined by the availability of favorable conditions of
nature, the national grid is optimized for the transmission and distribution of electricity from large
conventional power plants (IAEA 2002, PAIiIZ 2009a).
33 PAIiIZ (2009a) estimates an average cost of ¤1.6 million per MW of wind power installed. It indicates
the grid connection costs for a project with ¤0.5{0.8 million, and the additional expenses related to
auxiliary and road infrastructure (net of transport of equipment) with about ¤0.5 million per MW.
34 The variety of regional, national and EU RES investment-support programs has thus far not fully
been exploited due to issues with obtaining investment-related permissions (see also PAIiIZ 2009b).
35 In 2009, a Danish turbine-blade manufacturer opened a rst plant in Poland (PAIiIZ 2009a).
16ated with investments, apart, e.g., from payments for grid connection and infrastructure
improvement, have been received by foreign plant producers and project developers.36
(B5) Social acceptance. A further set of possible barriers for the additional deployment
of renewable technologies pertains to their social acceptance. Social barriers may become
manifest, for example, in low specic demand for renewable electricity by consumers, or
in opposition from local public or local authorities (OPTRES 2007). A particularity
of the Polish electricity market is that the prices for domestic consumers are still fully
regulated by the energy regulatory oce (URE 2009).37 Moreover, the fraction of renew-
able electricity provided is xed under the TGC scheme, and its supply has still been
relatively small. Hence, the possibilities for consumers both to reveal their preferences
on the power market, and to perceive the market development have remained limited.
If, in the future, electricity prices are further liberalized and the generation of renewable
electricity increases, the situation can be expected to change. In particular, social accep-
tance might further decrease, when consumers realize that the extra rents generated by
higher power prices (compared to a fully competitive system with environmental policy)
will particularly be received by the foreign wind-turbine industry, investors, renewable
plant operators, as well as by domestic polluting conventional generators, for the by RES
use avoided emissions. With continued deployment also a stronger reaction { negative
or positive { of the local public will be induced; possible opposition of local authori-
ties is closely linked to the imprecise formulation of regulation, discussed under points
(B1, B2).
Hence, in the likely scenario of rising power prices after their liberalization, due to
expanded RES use, and free generation-mix choice by consumers, social acceptance could
rather decrease, and the TGC scheme may be counterproductive.
4.2 Establishment of benecial side eects
(S1, S2) Local labor-market and industry stimulation. Stimulation of local job markets
and national industry development through RES support policies are often mentioned
as side-eects in policy debates. These arguments have also been made in relation to the
creation of the Polish TGC scheme (Ministry of Economy and Labour 2005). From a
welfare-economics perspective, they are unrelated to the environmental externality, and
can hardly be related to technology-related market failures, even in a second-best sense
36 The costs for the generator make up about 75-85% (¤1.2-1.32 million per MW) of the average cost
of a usual wind-power investment (PAIiIZ 2009a).
37 In 2008, the prices for industrial consumers and small and medium businesses were liberalized.
17(see footnote 3). From an economics point of view, these arguments need to be judged in
a general-equilibrium perspective. General equilibrium models show the economy-wide
implications of an intervention in the economy, thus, of a reallocation of scarce resources.
The additional generation costs through the implicit subsidies for renewable power pro-
ducers, which TGC schemes generate, are ultimately passed through to consumers and
drag their purchasing power for other products.38 As a consequence, employment that
is won in the renewable-energy sector will come at the cost of job losses in other sectors
of the economy; the question is whether the net employment eect is positive.39 It is
currently too early for a quantitative analysis of net employment eects. A certain expec-
tation can be derived by considering that crucial equipment and much human capital for
the planning, construction, nancing and operation of the new plants has been coming
from abroad (EWEA 2009, PAIiIZ 2009a, PSEW 2010). Only recently rms have started
to develop local sta for monitoring sales and installation activities, and a rst plant for
manufacturing turbine blades was set up (SGS 2009, Vestas 2009, footnote 35). Thus,
the Polish TGC scheme stimulates job creation and industry development in Poland and
abroad. Whether the overall eect is benecial for Poland is not clear.
(S3) Generation-mix diversication. The diversication of a country's generation port-
folio is another frequently quoted side-eect of RES support policies. The positive con-
notation of diversication is related to the possibly induced reduction of risk exposure
of the power-generation industry (Neuho and Twomey 2008).40 A higher RES use
in Poland has been expected to increase both the security of electricity supply, pollu-
tion abatement, and competition among generation technologies (Ministry of Economy
and Labour 2005). Part of the particular Polish situation is the historically very high
(over 95%) fraction of power generation from coal, coming mostly from domestic sources
(Eurostat 2008, URE 2008a).41 Thus, an eective support policy for RES technology
deployment will rebalance the generation mix towards RES. It is currently too early for
an empirical analysis. The following arguments suggest some caution as to whether this
diversication eect will increase supply security, and whether the increased competition
among generation technologies is clearly desirable. First, because the expanded use of
38 Traber and Kemfert (2009) illustrate this point in an electricity-market model with conventional gen-
erators with market power, international feedback, and a focus on the (for the mechanism equivalent)
German feed-in-tari scheme.
39 The general prediction is that a distortionary intervention in the economy entails a negative employ-
ment eect. However, the relationships are complex and need a detailed analysis.
40 See Roques (2008) for a critical discussion of the concept of diversity in a power-generation system
and the measurement of the costs and benets of diversication.
41 For example, in 2006 94.9% of the gross hard-coal supply was of domestic origin (63.2% of the imported
fraction came from Russia), 46% of the gross supply was burned in electricity plants (Eurostat 2008).
18RES will particularly be based on wind power, the issue of supply intermittency will be-
come more important, making supply management in the grid rather more challenging.
Second, while competitive pressure on conventional energy sources increases with their
lower market share, they are stabilized by the decreased need for abatement due to the
emissions reductions achieved by higher RES use. Moreover, the conventional technolo-
gies continue to be needed for backup purposes. Third, with investors and technology in
the Polish RES sector especially coming from abroad, in the short term the technological
dependence on other countries will rather rise.
(S4) Abatement of pollutants not covered by EU ETS. As a further side-eect, the
increased use of RES may, by substitution of conventional energy carriers, reduce the
emission of additional pollutants, beyond carbon dioxide, that are not covered by the
current emissions trading scheme (e.g., OPTRES 2007). A respective assessment should
be based on a life-cycle assessment of technologies (Pehnt 2006, Sovacool 2008). The po-
tential for abatement of additional pollutants from power generation is particularly high
if, as is the case in Poland, especially coal is replaced. Additional pollutants from coal
combustion may include carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, particulate
matter, heavy metals (including mercury), and radioactive trace elements (EIA 2001,
IAEA 2002, USGS 1997). Note that many of these pollutants are subject to a particular
environmental regulation on international or EU level, to which Poland complies or is
bound.42
4.3 Evaluation
The qualitative consideration in this section provides mixed ndings as to how the TGC
scheme contributes to overcoming barriers for, or establishing benecial side-eects as-
sociated with the deployment of additional renewable generation technology in Poland.
The major inducement to overcome legal and institutional barriers has come from EU
legislation and policies; the TGC scheme has been an outcome of this, not a cause. Un-
clear administrative rules still constitute a major obstacle for technology deployment,
to overcome them the TGC scheme is not necessary. The TGC scheme helps to allevi-
ate infrastructure barriers and funding and technological barriers. A caveat is that the
high rents under the scheme are in part due to its non-dierentiation among renewable
generation technologies and accrue to plant producers, investors and operators, many of
whom come from abroad, and also to conventional generators. Consumer reaction to RES
42 In particular, Poland is signatory of the protocols on nitrogen oxides, sulphur emissions, and heavy
metals of the Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution (UNECE 2010).
19support has thus far been low, but power prices are still regulated, and thus the market
revelation of consumer preferences is limited. Social barriers may increase with rising
power prices and when consumers learn about the distribution of extra rents generated
by the subsidy. The side-eects regarding stimulation of local job market and national
industry, as well as technological diversication and its desirability are generally hard
to determine. While jobs are being created for the operation of wind farms, the national
production of equipment for commercial plants is not yet in view. Diversication eects
have been limited by the de-facto support focus of the TGC scheme on wind power. The
argument regarding abatement of pollutants not covered by an ETS should compare
technologies on a life-cycle basis and needs to take into account the other regulation
which is in place; generally, substitution of coal by wind power has a high potential for
reducing additional pollutants.
We conclude that based on the acillary reasons considered no clear case can be made
for the advantageousness of the application of a TGC scheme in Poland. In particular,
from the consideration of these reasons no guidance arises as to what the RES-electricity
quota, and, thus, the level of investment subsidies, should be in Poland.
5 Conclusion
Policies for the promotion of the deployment of renewable-energy technologies, includ-
ing feed-in taris for green electricity and quota obligation schemes based on tradable
green certicates (TGC), are today applied in a majority of OECD countries (e.g., Aus-
tralian Government 2009, EU Commission 2008, Wiser et al. 2007). Interestingly, also
in the scientic literature the justication of such policies has hardly been discussed.
In this paper, we provide an early analysis of the Polish TGC scheme, introduced in
2006 to contribute the country's part to the EU expansion target for RES use. From
a welfare-economics perspective, support policies for renewable-technology deployment
can neither be justied in a rst-best, nor in a second-best sense (section 1). In par-
ticular, if an emissions trading scheme (ETS) is in place that fully covers the energy
industry, deployment support for renewable generation technology cannot provide addi-
tional reductions of emissions capped by the ETS. We discuss how ancillary reasons, in
form of overcoming deployment barriers and the establishment of benecial side-eects,
can provide a justication for the application of a TGC scheme in Poland. With high
investment incentives, especially for wind power (section 3), the scheme helps to alleviate
deployment barriers related to infrastructure, funding, and technology availability. But
20the scheme is not necessary to overcome barriers on legal and institutional level, and
may rather decrease social acceptance when, after their liberalization, power prices for
consumers start to rise. Benets with respect to job-market and industry stimulation and
as related to technological diversication are generally hard to establish. At least, there
is a clear potential that the substitution of coal by wind power abates pollutants that
are only insucently regulated otherwise. The consideration of these ancillary reasons,
however, gives no guidance as to what the RES-electricity quota should be.
From the welfare-economics perspective, a well regulated market will pick the right
technologies endogenously (see also Neuho and Twomey 2008). This requires especially
an appropriate internalization of the emissions externality. In view of the justication
question, the choice between emissions trading scheme and support policy for RES tech-
nology deployment is not arbitrary. It is hard not to conclude that such support policies
tend to constitute a awed policy instrument (e.g., contra Gillenwater 2008b). The task
is rather to improve existing emissions trading schemes and the mix of environmental and
technology policies, to get appropriate incentives for renewable technology deployment.
Appendix
A.1 The Romanian TGC system
Romania became a full member of the European Union in 2007. In order to fulll its obligations
related to the EU Directive 2001/77/EC and the Kyoto Protocol, the Romanian parliament
set up conditions for the RES support in 2003. The basis for RES promotion is the Electricity
Law No. 13/2007 (Parliament of Romania 2007). In 2004, the government decided to introduce
a TGC system for RES promotion (Government of Romania 2004). After a revision in 2005,
its framework is as follows (Government of Romania 2005):
￿ Promotion is given to power generation from small hydropower (< 10 MW), wind,
biomass, biogas, photovoltaics, solar and geothermal power.
￿ Energy distributors have to fulll an RES quota dened by the government. In Table
5 it is shown for the years 2008-2012.43 Note that the Romanian RES-support policies
totally disregard the pre-installed hydropower plants with nominal production capacities
above 10MW.
￿ RES electricity is traded with priority at the energy exchange OPCOM. For the years
2005-2012 there is an upper price limit of ¤42 and a lower price limit of ¤24 in certicate
43 In 2005 the RES quota amounted to 0.7%, in 2006 to 2.22%, in 2007 to 3.74%.
21trading dened by the national energy regulatory authority ANRE (ANRE 2007a).44
Alternatively, an RES generator may sell TGC and electricity to a retailer at xed
prices via a bilateral contract.
￿ An energy distributor who fails to fulll his RES quota is obliged to pay a penalty of
twice the upper price limit for every missing green certicate. The penalty thus currently
amounts to ¤84.
￿ The green certicates are issued by Transelectrica, the owner of the national transmission
grid, not by ANRE. Unsold certicates are bought back by Transelectrica. The resulting
price sets the eective lower price limit for TGC.
On 3 November 2008 the Romanian government amended the RES promotion scheme, ex-
tending it until 2030. The RES quotas were slightly decreased for the time until 2012. They
increase thereafter. In order to create more equal deployment conditions for the dierent RES,
the number of TGC per MWh is now technology-specic. As our analysis was done before the
new legislation came into force and its consideration does not change our results in substance,
we stick to the set out previous framework.
A.1.1 Development of prices and RES production in the Romanian TGC system
In 2007 46,299 TGC were issued to RES producers, 41,364 (89.34%) of them were traded at
OPCOM (OPCOM 2008b). In order to fulll the 2007 RES quota of 3.74%, given an electricity
consumption of 58.49 million MWh (CIA 2008), the issuance of 2.187 million green certicates
would have been necessary. This dierence between supply and demand explains why the TGC
price in Romania has been remaining at the upper price limit in the past (Figure 3). The reason
Figure 3: TGC price development { Romania (Source: OPCOM)
44 Despite the Lei as local currency, the price limits are xed in ¤ and adjusted annually based on
exchange rate developments.
22for the weak emission of TGCs in 2007 were the missing RES capacities. Only 47 MW were
registered, 40 MW of which were small hydropower and 7 MW wind energy (Transelectrica
2008a). To avoid high penalty payments of energy distributors, ANRE cut the RES quota in
December 2007 from 3.74% to 0.098%. The new value represented 57,320 TGC. 2007 was the
last year in which ANRE had the possibility to cut RES quotas (ANRE 2007b).
A.1.2 Development forecast for the Romanian TGC market
As shown in Table 5, the demand for TGC will rapidly increase in Romania in the next years.
In the short term demand could be met by supply as RES capacities will remain low. At the end
Table 5: TGC demand estimation for Romania (Source energy consumption: Ministerul
Economiei 2007)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Electricity demand (TWh) 62.5 64.2 66.1 67.7 69.5
RES quota (%) 5.2 6.78 8.3 8.3 8.3
TGC demand (million) 3.25 4.35 5.49 5.62 5.77
of April 2008 the registered RES production capacity was still at 47 MW. Because of the high
TGC prices a rise in RES capacities can be expected in the mid and long term. The estimations
for the Romanian RES potential range between 23{26.075 TWh for wind power and 3.08{3.6
TWh for small hydropower (Barbu 2007, Ministerul Economiei 2007). The implementation
degree of this potential cannot be estimated at the moment. Transelectrica (2008b) reports
that only wind farms with a nominal production capacity of 4,000 MW have been scheduled.
It points out that due to a shortage of backup capacities only 1,000{1,500 MW of wind power
can be connected to the grid in a rst step.
Barbu (2007) estimates the load factor to amount to 34% in the best wind regions in Roma-
nia. If new wind farms with an output of 1,500 MW are connected to the grid, given this load
factor 4.476 million TGC would be issued.45 This hypothetical TGC supply would only meet
the 2009 demand (Table 5). When 1,500 MW of wind energy will be realized, cannot clearly
be foreseen today. EWEA (2008b) assumes that only 50 MW of wind power will be erected in
Romania until 2010. This estimation seems relatively low given the potential available in Ro-
mania. States in comparable situations have realized higher growth rates.46 Even if wind farms
with a cumulated capacity of 1,500 MW are built until 2012, the issued 4.5 million TGC would
not meet the demand of 5.77 million certicates shown in Table 5. The remaining gap could
45 This amount is calculated as: 4,467,600 MWh = 1,500 MW * 24 h * 365 days * 0.34 LF.
46 For example, in 2007 in Bulgaria 34 MW, in Greece 125 MW, in Poland 123 MW and in Turkey 97
MW of new wind turbines have been erected (EWEA 2008a).
23perhaps be closed by small hydropower plants, but this requires at least the realization of 41%
or 320 MW of the estimated small hydro potential. Therefore Romania cannot be expected to
fulll its RES quota in the near future. Due to the excess demand for TGC their price should
remain near its upper limit of ¤42 until 2012.
This reveals another issue of the Romanian TGC system. As the penalty payment for an
electricity distributor is twice the upper trading limit of a TGC, the larger TGC amount can
be expected to be traded in bilateral contracts, while their exchange trading will dry up. The
reason for this development is the RES producers' possibility to sell certicates to distributors
at a price above ¤42. As long as the price stays below ¤84, retailers will agree, as they can avoid
the penalty payment of ¤84. ANRE tries to avoid these complications by getting informed of
all bilateral contracts. But market actors should be able to use methods of \creative contract
design" to overcome the restriction. The issue could be solved by equalizing buy-out price and
upper price limit.
Besides selling certicates trading electricity is the second revenue source for RES produc-
ers. The average spot market price for power traded at the OPCOM day-ahead market was
¤47.89/MWh in 2007. There also exists an OPCOM platform for bilateral power contracts.
The average price of these contracts was ¤48.35/MWh in 2007, the rst contracts for 2008
reached prices up to ¤50/MWh (OPCOM 2008a). With an income from selling power with
¤48{50/MWh and ¤24{42 for TGC, an RES producer could receive ¤72{92/MWh. If market
actors are able to bypass the upper price limit for TGC, a combined income of up to ¤134
may be expected.
A.2 Conditions for wind-power investments in Romania
This subsection studies the conditions for wind-power investments analogously to the Polish
case in section 3. The framework data are adapted for the Romanian case in four respects: the
investment volume is ¤30.36 million, the operational costs increase at the constant rate of 2%
p.a., the coupon is 5.5%, the tax rate is 16%.
A.2.1 Option 1: market sale of TGC and electricity
Banking case. In 2007 electricity has been traded at the Romanian day-ahead market at an
average price of ¤47.89/MWh (OPCOM 2008a). To simplify we assume a value of ¤48/MWh
in the banking case. This price is not index-linked to the ination rate for reasons of caution.
The demand for TGC in Romania will exceed the supply at least until 2012 (subsection A.1.2).
For this reason one can expect the price of a certicate to stay at the upper limit of ¤42, which
we also assume here. In 2013-2020 the RES quota may be fullled. Hence, we assume a TGC
price at the lower limit of ¤24 for this period. Past 2020 the promotion of TGC will become
24fully canceled in this scenario. The resulting price development of the banking-case is shown
in Table 6:
Table 6: Income banking case { Romania.
2009{2012 2013{2020 2021{2028
Power income (¤/MWh) 48 48 48
Income per TGC (¤) 42 24 0
Based on these assumptions the project requires an equity ratio of 31.3% or ¤9.5 million
equity to fulll the condition of DSCR > 1:3. The resulting IRR amounts to 6.02%.
Base case. In 2009 the basic value for the power income amounts to ¤48/MWh in this
scenario. It is index-linked to the ECB ination target of 2%. An adequate assumption for the
TGC-price development is again more dicult. Although the upper price limit in 2008 was
set at ¤42, we use a value of ¤46 to appoint the TGC income for the years 2009-2012. The
reason for this is the announced increase of the upper price limit up to ¤50. As it is not xed,
we take a haircut on the assumed income. From 2010 the TGC income decreases annually by
10%. This rate is smaller than the one chosen for Poland, because one can expect it takes more
time to fulll the RES quota as the Romanian market is less developed. Nevertheless the lower
price limit of ¤24 remains valid. As it is not clear how the Romanian RES scheme will develop
past 2020 we assume from that year an annual TGC-price decrease of 20%. The lower price
limit looses its validity. Figure 4 illustrates this development. Using the banking-case equity
Figure 4: Illustration of price development in base case { Romania.
ratio of 31.3%, the base case leads to an IRR of 13.26% for a 20-MW reference project.
25A.2.2 Option 2: bilateral contracts
The conclusion of bilateral contracts is especially interesting in Romania as the framework has
an appeal to avoid market trading, which enables RES producers to achieve a TGC income
beyond the upper price limit of ¤42 (subsection A.1.2). We rst analyze which IRR are pos-
sible, when the actors respect the price limit. In a second step we have a closer look at the
attractiveness of avoiding the price limit.
In 2007 the average power price at the Romanian day-ahead market was ¤47.89/MWh
(OPCOM 2008a). We assume ¤48/MWh with regard to the agreed power component of the
bilateral contract. For the TGC component of the contract, RES producers are in a favorable
position to negotiate due to the high buy-out price of ¤84 a retailer has to pay for a missing
certicate. We assume a price of ¤40 as TGC component, near the upper price limit. These
values add up to a combined income of ¤88/MWh of RES power generated. Under consid-
eration of this contract the cash-ow model gives an equity ratio of 2.7% (¤0.81m) and an
IRR of 25.47%. The sensitivity analysis shows again how tightly linked IRR, equity ratio and
negotiated prices are (Table 7).
Table 7: Sensitivity analysis bilateral contracts { Romania.
Combined income (¤) 70 73 76 79 82 85 88
Equity ratio (%) 26.0 22.1 18.1 14.5 10.5 6.6 2.7
IRR (%) 5.71 7.19 8.92 10.94 13.62 17.57 25.47
We now consider the case of certicate trading beyond the upper price limit of ¤42 in
bilateral contracts. The power component remains at ¤48/MWh. For the TGC part, we dis-
tinguish two periods. The TGC price will reach ¤63 during 2009-2012. RES producer and
retailer thereby share the advantage from the dierence of bay-out payment and upper price
limit of ¤42. Retailers suggest that the RES quota may be fullled after 2012. So they set a
TGC price of ¤36 for the second period of 2013-2028. Table 8 summarizes these assumptions.
This kind of contract enables investors to use 100% debt nancing within the project and
Table 8: Income with bilateral contract and avoidance of upper price limit { Romania.
2009{2012 2013{2028
Power income (¤/MWh) 48 48
Income per TGC (¤) 63 36
Combined income (¤/MWh) 111 84
26simultaneously fullls DSCR > 1:3 during the whole project duration. As there is no equity in
the project, the IRR calculation is not possible. This implies that the capital value is positive
and the project is always justiable. The capital value of the described 20-MW project based
on dividends and a discount rate of 12% amounts to ¤5,714,662.
A.2.3 Evaluation
Also in Romania, the two considered investor strategies lead to positive IRR, and in the case
of a bilateral contract the IRR is higher than in the market-trading option. The banking case
in Option 1 leads to a relatively small equity ratio of 31.3% (compared to 70.1% in the Polish
case). This divergence results from the lower price limit for TGC in Romania. This limit reduces
volatility and price risks considered by banks, reducing the required equity ratios.
The CAPM reward-to-risk ratio for wind farm projects in Romania amounts to 12%.47
Thus, the IRR exceeds the reward-to-risk ratio under both investor strategies, implying positive
capital values and that the reference project is marketable in both cases. The bilateral-contract
approach is, however, still more favorable. Hence a high share of bilateral contracts can be
expected in the Romanian market. Moreover, due to the expected high investor returns further
increases in the RES volume seem likely in the near future.
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